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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between a rms market value and the mobility of scientic
and technical personnel in its sectoral and geographic proximity. I uncover distinct positive and
negative e¤ects of mobility on market value that operate through various channels. I document
a positive e¤ect of scientic labor mobility on market value through knowledge assets embedded
within technologically similar rms: rms having large stocks of external knowledge in their
disposal benet from increased mobility of scientic and technical personnel. On the other hand,
rms that lack large external stocks of knowledge su¤er a negative e¤ect. The detrimental e¤ect
of mobility is larger for rms in more competitive industries, supporting the hypothesis that
estimates capture the losses due to outbound knowledge and human capital. However, such
losses are not signicantly di¤erent for rms with di¤erent levels of R&D intensity. The positive
and negative e¤ects of scientic labor mobility, on average, are of similar magnitudes, making
the average rm "break even" in terms of its net impact. These results are consistent with
previous ndings, and provide further insight into why innovative rms cluster in industrial
districts.
Keywords: Scientic labor mobility; Market value; Knowledge ows; R&D; Patents; Citations;
GMM.
JEL Classication: O31, O32, O33, J62, L6, C23.
A previous version of this study was circulated with the title "Intra-Industry Knowledge Spillovers and Scientic
Labor Mobility."
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1 Introduction
It has long been understood that the mobility of scientic and technical personnel is an important
conduit for knowledge ows among innovating rms (Arrow, 1962; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Singh
and Agrawal, 2011). The mobility of scientic and technical personnel breaks down traditional rm
boundaries, as employees carry specic or general human capital generated within the rm to other
rms that may nd its use protable, and enjoy part of the ensuing rents. As a result, the movement
of labor creates di¢ culties for rms in appropriating the returns to their R&D investments. On the
other hand, intellectual capital of rms with related technologies or products become available to the
rm simply by hiring former employees of a rival. Recent research on inventor mobility has shown
that mobile inventors tend to produce innovations of higher quality than non-movers (Palomeras
and Melero, 2010; Lenzi, 2013). Hence, knowledge ows that occur via personnel mobility are likely
to be more valuable and critical than could otherwise occur, as scientists carry tacit, uncodiable
knowledge that can only be transferred as embedded in their human capital (Polanyi, 1966; Nelson
and Winter, 1982).
The evidence that links scientic1 labor mobility to knowledge ows rests on the methodology
introduced by Ja¤e et al. (1993), who trace knowledge ows by studying the frequency of patent
citations between economic units. While this methodology is well-suited to study various causes
and aspects of knowledge ows, it is naturally silent on the value of knowledge ows that occur
as a result of the mobility of scientic personnel. Hence, little is known about the precise gains or
loses faced by a rm due to increased labor mobility.
The current paper lls this gap by studying the relationship between scientic labor mobility in
a rms sectoral and geographic vicinity, and the rms market value. The exercise is undertaken
for a large panel of U.S. manufacturing rms, and documents both positive and negative e¤ects
of mobility on market value through various channels. I nd that increased mobility of scientic
personnel contributes to market value for rms that have access to large stocks of externally created
knowledge assets. The magnitude of this e¤ect is signicant: a percentage point increase in the
geographic (resp. sectoral) mobility rate increases market value by as much as 6.5% (resp. 3.1%)
for a rm that has access to the mean external knowledge stock. On the other hand, a rm
that lacks access to large stocks of external knowledge loses market value as a result of increased
1For uidity, I often use the term "scientic" personnel instead of the more cumbersome "scientic and technical"
personnel. These refer to a number of specic job classications which will be introduced in Section 4.1.
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scientic turnover. This could be interpreted as a loss due to outbound knowledge capital, looser
appropriability conditions, and the loss of valuable human capital. Seeking further explanation for
such losses, I nd that they tend to be larger for rms operating in more competitive industries,
which is in line with the interpretation attached to the estimates above. On average, the opposite
e¤ects of mobility are of similar magnitudes, and a rm that faces the mean stock of external
knowledge approximately "breaks even" in terms of the net e¤ect of labor turnover. However, I
do not nd any e¤ect of mobility that operates through a rms own R&D enterprise: Firms with
larger R&D intensity do not su¤er or gain more due to increased mobility.
My estimates also reveal that a signicant portion of inter-rm transfers of knowledge can be
explained by the mobility of scientic personnel. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in
the rate of scientic mobility creates knowledge ows the value of which measure as much as 18%
of the total spillover e¤ect. The same percentage reaches levels as high as 43% if mobility increases
from its minimum sample value to its sample average.
My measure of scientic labor mobility is taken from the U.S. Current Population Survey, which
allows constructing mobility rates for specic job classications at the industrial sector and state
level. Knowledge ows due to personnel mobility are most likely to occur via hires from rms
operating in the rms own sectoral classication. Many scholars have also noted that knowledge
ows tend to be geographically localized (Ja¤e et al., 1993; Singh and Marx, 2013). Accordingly,
the study exploits the variation in scientic mobility in a rms geographic, as well as sectoral
proximity. I address endogeneity concerns by adopting a GMM framework, and use additional
instruments to account for the endogeneity of the mobility rate. Aside from various personal
characteristics of the sample of scientic personnel (age, race, marital status, living situation) that
have bearing on their mobility patterns, I also use the cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in
the strictness of the enforcement of non-compete covenants (henceforth non-competes, or NCCs)
across U.S. States as an instrument for state-level mobility. For this purpose, I use the coding
of non-compete enforcement constructed by Garmaise (2011) and back-dated by Bird and Knopf
(2010) to introduce exogenous shifts in the rate of observed job changes2.
My analyses deal with the value of knowledge ows that occur through the movement of scientic
labor. One may be tempted to consider such ows as externalities, but this view is misleading.
Since the transfer of scientists and engineers is a market transaction, it is reasonable to expect the
resulting knowledge ows to be priced, to the extent they can be predicted. Hence, knowledge ows
2 I am grateful to Robert Bird and John Knopf for sharing their coding with me.
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that are considered in this paper are most likely not pure knowledge externalities. Møen (2005)
o¤ers evidence that spillovers due to employer changes are at least partially internalized by labor
markets. However, whether these ows are fully priced by the market is not clear, and it isnt
straightforward to attach an externality interpretation to the papers main results (on this point,
also see Griliches, 1972; Zucker et al., 1998; Breschi and Lissoni, 2001).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related strands of literature.
Section 3 introduces the market value equation and describes the papers main empirical model.
Section 4 introduces the main data sources and details data-related issues. Section 5 deals with
econometric inference and estimation and presents the papers results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
That the transfers of knowledge are facilitated by the movement of engineers has long been un-
derstood by researchers. Arrow (1962) emphasizes the public good properties of knowledge, and
makes the aforementioned case for the mobility of engineers. Stephan (1996) mentions the then
lack of empirical work on the sources of inter-rm knowledge spillovers, and suggests the mobility
of scientists within the industrial sector as a potentially important channel to be investigated in
future empirical work. Building on these ideas, many scholars performed empirical tests of the
claim that mobility of technical personnel facilitates knowledge ows. Almeida and Kogut (1999),
studying the mobility of patent holders, show that inter-rm movements of engineers inuences the
local transfer of knowledge. Song et al. (2003) study the patenting activities of engineers in the
global semiconductor industry who moved from U.S. to non-U.S. rms to show that both domestic
and international mobility of engineers are conducive to knowledge ows. Zucker and Darby (2009)
argue that critical knowledge is transferred through the regional and national migration of "star"
scientists. Studying the movements of a sample of elite life scientists, Azoulay et al. (2011) show
that citations of scientic articles from the new to the old location signicantly increase after a
move. Lenzi (2010) provides evidence from Italian data that the mobility of inventors spurs cumu-
lative knowledge building. Singh and Agrawal (2011) demonstrate that rms signicantly increase
the use of their new employeesprior inventions, which they interpret as evidence for "learning-
by-hiring". Ejsing et al. (2013) study a matched employer-employee data for Danish rms to show
that newcomers to the rm contribute more to innovation than long-term employees. A contrary
result is produced by Stolpe (2002), who nds the mobility of inventors in LCD technology to be
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unrelated to knowledge ows. He argues that this is due to the largely codiable, scientic knowl-
edge base of LCD technology. Møen (2005) uses Norwegian data to test a model of human capital
accumulation to show that engineers pay for the knowledge they accumulate early in their lives,
indicating that knowledge externalities due to scientic mobility are (at least partially) internalized
by the scientic labor market.
A similar line of literature studies knowledge ows that occur via mobility from multinational
corporations (MNCs) to local rms. Görg and Strobl (2005) use a survey of manufacturing rms in
Ghana to show that domestic rms whose owners has work experience in a multinational have higher
productivity compared to other domestic rms. Balsvik (2011) shows that Norwegian workers that
move from a MNC to a domestic rm contribute 20 to 25% more to the productivity of the host
rm than workers without such experience. Poole (2013) demonstrates that worker mobility to
domestic Brazilian rms from MNCs causes an increase in the wages of domestic workers, which
she interprets as an e¤ect due to knowledge spillovers.
Recruiting scientists from competitors is a wide-spread practice innovating rms rely on to gain
access to rivals innovations. Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) nd that 42% of rms in a sample
of Belgian manufacturing use hiring skilled personnel as a strategy to acquire new technologies.
Hyde (2003) and Saxenian (1994) both emphasize Silicon Valleys highly mobile labor market that
allows inter-rm knowledge transfers. Hyde (2003) provides several interviews with Silicon Valley
scientists and CEOs that support this view. A particularly striking quote from the book is by
a Silicon Valley CEO: "We dont do R&D, we do A&D, acquire and develop". Saxenian (1994)
argues that the enormous success of Silicon Valley compared to Massachusettss Route 128 lies in
the formers tradition of loose employer-employee ties, open rm boundaries, and laws that protect
employeesrights to move to rival rms or form rival start-ups. Carr and Gorman (2001) argue
that rms that pursue trade secret litigation against former employees su¤er serious reputational
harm, and face a decline in their stock prices. Hyde (2003) adds that this hurts the companys
recruitment e¤orts, since high quality job candidates are not willing to work for a rm that might
limit their future prospects.
On the theory front, Pakes and Nitzan (1983) study employment contracts with scientists in an
environment in which the scientist has the option to leave the employer with the knowledge of the
innovations created within the rm. Kim and Marschke (2005) extend this model to incorporate
the employers patenting decision, and test its main implication that increased probability of mis-
appropriation by the scientist increases the employers propensity to patent innovations. Lewis and
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Yao (2006) study a model of contracting and matching between rms and scientists to provide an
equilibrium explanation for the mobility of scientists, and a rationale for open R&D environments.
Their main results are driven by the incompleteness of employment contracts.
The current studys emphasis on the geographic, as well as the sectoral dimension of labor
mobility is inspired by the literature on the geography of spillovers, which has found physical
geography to be an important impediment to knowledge ows3. Ja¤e et al. (1993) show that
citations to a patent are more likely to come from the same state and SMSA as the original patent,
which they interpret as evidence for the localized nature of knowledge ows. Almeida and Koguts
(1999) study on the mobility of inventors reaches a similar conclusion. Singh and Marx (2013)
nd that country and state borders limit knowledge ows above and beyond physical distance.
Singh (2005) and Breschi and Lissoni (2009) highlight that physical geography may be acting as
a proxy for local scientic networks, in that the e¤ect of distance diminishes once the e¤ects of
collaboration networks are controlled for. Mobility and network accounts of knowledge ows are
intimately linked, in that the movements of scientists across rms and across space extend existing
social networks, and are likely to be limited by them (Zellner and Fornahl, 2002). Agrawal et al.
(2006) investigate such an aspect of labor mobility by studying social ties that survive geographic
separation. They argue that connections that are conducive to knowledge ows are resistant to
geographic separation, hence are likely to generate enduring links between the new and old rm or
location of the moving scientist.
My results also provide further insight into why innovating rms cluster in industrial districts.
The literature on agglomeration economies (Marshall, 1920; Krugman, 1991) puts special emphasis
on labor pooling and local knowledge spillovers as critical determinants of rmslocation choices.
It has been recognized that rms locate near technically related rivals in order to gain access to
essential resources that may otherwise be elusive (Marshall, 1920; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003).
Stuart and Sorenson (2003) argue that industries cluster since entrepreneurs cannot mobilize es-
sential resources without access to required social ties. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) nd that
the propensity to cluster is linked more closely to local spillovers than to advantages in production.
Rosenthal and Strange (2001) use proxies for the common explanations of agglomeration, nding
that the Ellison-Glaeser spatial concentration index (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997) is best explained
by labor pooling motives at various geographic units. Ellison et al. (2010) nd similar labor needs
3This is in contrast to early models that incorporated spillovers into economic analyses with the assumption that
knowledge exhibited properties of pure public goods, as in models of endogenous growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988).
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to be an important determinant of agglomeration, along with supplier relationships, spillovers, and
shared natural advantages. The current papers results build on these ideas, and have interesting
implications for the individual, rm-level incentives to locate close to technically similar rivals.
First, the papers main result documents that the negative e¤ects of labor mobility are large, but
do not outweigh its benets on average. In addition, the negative e¤ect does not depend on the
rms own R&D intensity. These set of results jointly have two implications. First, disincentives
for labor pooling are not strong enough to create disagglomeration economies, as long as the rms
in question are su¢ ciently innovative as a collective. Second, disincentives are not stronger for
more innovative rms. Hence, results provide rm-level evidence for the labor pooling motivation
for industrial agglomeration4.
The current paper also draws from, and contributes to the literature on the measurement of
spillover e¤ects. The common methodology in this literature is to examine the e¤ects of suitably
aggregated stocks of external knowledge, termed "spillover pools", on a measure of performance
or value, over and above those of the rms own knowledge assets. I draw from the works of Ja¤e
(1986) and Bloom et al. (2013) in introducing spillover pools in typical market value equations.
The preferred method is to build a weighted sum of external knowledge assets for each rm, where
weights measure the technical proximity of the inventive activity of the rm with each remaining
rm in the sample. I follow this approach, and also build and use measures of geographic con-
cordance between the inventive activities of rms as weights in a similar aggregation procedure.
This approach properly matches the units at which mobility rates are observed to the knowledge
base most likely to be transferred by such mobility. Key results of the paper rely on interactions
of the mobility rate with various other variables, including suitably constructed spillover pools.
Estimates reveal that a signicant portion of inter-rm transfers of knowledge can be explained
by the mobility of scientic personnel. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in the rate
of scientic mobility creates knowledge ows the value of which measure as much as 18% of total
4Obviously, I do not suggest that this is the primary reason for why agglomeration economies and industrial
clusters exist, but propose this as one explanation for why they are robust and widespread. Even if a rm expects
net losses due to the highly mobile labor market in a district, it may still nd it imperative to locate close to it, since
operation may be impossible without the spillovers discussed in this paper. This would be the case, for instance,
if close proximity to the region is essential to gain access to the "tools of the trade". To understand the evolution
of industrial districts, one must pay careful attention to the history and evolution of such districts, which tend to
support the view that they are formed by the dissipation of essential knowledge through social networks, mobility,
and spin-o¤s. In this regard, the evolution of high-tech districts such as Silicon Valley are not special cases, but
examples of how a newfound "craft" creates local comperative advantages, and tends to keep and accumulate these
advantages over time (Krugman, 1991). Historical accounts of how such crafts show similar patterns of knowledge
localization are abundant.
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spillovers, when spillover pools are held constant at the mean. The same percentage reaches levels
as high as 43% if mobility increases from its minimum sample value to its sample average.
The variation in the enforcement of non-compete covenants enters as an instrument in the
current papers analyses. There is a burgeoning literature suggesting that stricter enforcement of
NCCs signicantly restrain employee mobility. Gilson (1999) argues that the initial condition for
the success of Silicon Valley compared to Route 128 is the ban of non-competes in California. Marx
et al. (2009), using Michigans 1985 change of statute as a natural experiment, nd that stricter
non-compete enforcement reduces worker mobility, particularly for workers with rm-specic skills
and in narrow technical elds. Marx et al. (2012) uncover a brain drain from states that enforce
NCCs to states that do not. Marx (2011) nds that employees that are subject to non-competes
commonly take career detours, i.e., they work outside their main eld of expertise. For a review of
the debate on NCC enforcement, and of the economic literature, see Marx and Fleming (2012).
3 Empirical Model
3.1 Market Value Equation
I start with a market value equation in the tradition of Griliches (1981). The market value of rm
i at time t is assumed to take the form
Vit = qt

Ait +
X
q
qKit;q

(1)
where Vit is the market value of the rm (the sum of the values of common stock, preferred stock,
and total debt net of assets), Ait is ordinary physical assets, and Kit;q; q = 1; ::: represent the rms
various knowledge (more generally, intangible) assets. Parameter  allows for non-constant scale
e¤ects, and

q
	
measure the shadow value of knowledge assets relative to ordinary assets. From
(1), dividing both sides with Ait; taking logs, imposing constant returns to scale, and using the
linear approximation log (1 + x) = x; we get
log

Vit
Ait

= log qt +
X
q
q
Kit;q
Ait
(2)
which can be interpreted as a regression specication with year-specic intercepts (log qt), and
where the shadow values of intangibles

q
	
are coe¢ cients to be estimated. The variable on the
left hand side is the logarithm of Tobins q, the market value of the rm relative to the replacement
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value of its physical assets, and qt is interpreted as the average value of Tobins q at year t. The
motivation behind (2) is to look for sources of deviation from equilibrium (q = 1) in the rms
intangible knowledge assets5.
In estimating variants of equation (2), knowledge assets are usually proxied by the rms stocks
of R&D, patents, and forward citations. I follow most of the literature in using the rms R&D stock
as a measure of its knowledge assets, which turns equation (2) into a regression with Tobins q as
the dependent variable and eRit = Rit=Ait, R&D stock divided by assets as an independent variable.
In addition, I follow Hall et al. (2005) in including eCit = Cit=Pit, the rms forward citation stock
divided by its patent stock in the equation, as this variable captures the overall quality of the
rms stock of innovations (Trajtenberg, 1990; Albert et al., 1991; Harho¤ et al., 1999; Giummo,
2003)6. All knowledge assets are used in stock form, calculated as perpetual inventories with 15%
depreciation7. For instance, Rit is computed recursively by Rit = rit + :85  Rit 1; where rit
represents rm is R&D expenditures during year t: The computation of Cit and Pit are similar.
Following Ja¤e (1986) and Bloom et al. (2013), I alter the market value equation by including
measures of externally created knowledge (spillover pools)8. The spillover pool that is available to
the rm (SP hK;it) is calculated as a weighted sum of knowledge assets for a set of external rms.
Superscript h indicates the level of aggregation at which the variable is dened and measured (sector
or geography), and subscript K the type of proxy for knowledge capital to be used in aggregation.
In line with the papers focus on sectoral and geographic mobility rates, two di¤erent aggregation
procedures are employed, in order to match spillover pools to the relevant rate of labor mobility.
These procedures will be detailed in the next subsection. At each aggregation level, I use three
di¤erent indicators for the knowledge stocks of external rms, following conventional measures used
to represent the rms own knowledge assets. These are R&D stocks (Rjt for rm j 6= i), forward
citation stocks (Cjt) and the ratio of forward citation stock to patent stock ( eCjt). In addition to
5A thorough discussion of the foundations of Tobins q is outside the scope of the current paper, and the interested
reader is referred to Hayashi (1982) and Wildasin (1984). Hall (1993) and Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) discuss
various advantages of using market value compared to accounting measures of performance.
6A di¤erence between the equation used here and that of Hall et al (2005) is that I exclude the rms propensity
to patent (Patent stock/R&D stock). This is because the coe¢ cient for this term is statistically indistinguishable
from zero in all specications, which is consistent with the literature that precedes Hall et al (2005). They argue that
this term partially controls for the e¤ects of rm size, for which I control for using a direct measure, i.e, sales.
7This follows the convention in most of the previous literature. There is little known about the true depreciation
rate of knowledge, and this has been a long lasting open question. Hall (2007) makes an extensive e¤ort to estimate the
rate of obsolescence of R&D investments, and nds estimates ranging from -6% to 40%, with implications of market
value analysis being consistent with rates as high as 20-40%. Accordingly, I stick to the conventional depreciation
rate of 15%, but test the robustness of my main results using various rates between 20-40% in unreported analysis.
8One way to motivate this is to assume that additional terms that are likely to a¤ect market value enter through
a a rm-year specic component of the intercept, which may be parametrized accordingly.
9
R&D stocks, the use of citations adjust for the quality of the inventive activity of external rms,
which is intended to better capture the value of knowledge assets that can benet remaining rms.
Given previous ndings on the relationship between scientic labor mobility and knowledge ows
(Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Singh and Agrawal, 2011) we expect measures of scientic labor mobility
(M) to be instrumental in drawing value from the spillover pool. This motivates the inclusion of an
interaction of the spillover pool with a suitably matched measure of mobility (Mht  SP hK;it), where
the level of aggregation (h) is common for both variables. As the mobility rate is expected to add
or destroy value above and beyond that through external knowledge, I include a separate mobility
term to pick up such e¤ects. The main specication to be estimated therefore becomes
log

Vit
Ait

 log qt + R eRit + C eCit (3)
+SSP
h
K;it + MSMht  SP hK;it + MMht
+x0it K + i + "it
A Box-Cox test indicates that the logarithm of the mobility rate gives a better t to data, hence
Mht denotes the logarithm of the mobility rate of scientists and engineers at the aggregation unit h
and year t. The sector classication for mobility closely follows Hall et al. (2005), and is described
in Table 1. The time-specic intercept (log qt) is modelled using year dummies, and xit is a vector
of additional controls that will be introduced below. The error term uit = i + "it is the usual
one-way error component specication, where "it is an i.i.d. error with zero mean, and i is the
unobserved permanent e¤ect for rm i.
3.2 Handling Sectors and Geography
I investigate scientic labor mobility at two di¤erent levels of aggregation, one at the level of
industrial sectors, and another at the level of physical geography, i.e., states. This necessitates
dening and computing spillover pools in a way that matches knowledge assets to the agents that
are most likely to carry them as they move across rms. When interest lies on the mobility rate at
the sector level, SP hK;it is calculated as
SPSK;it = log
P
j2SEC(i); j 6=iwijKjt (4)
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where SEC(i) is the sector classication of rm i; and wij is a measure of the technical proximity
between rms i and j. I restrict the summation to rms operating in the same sectoral classication
to match the units at which mobility rates and external knowledge are observed. To construct each
wij ; I follow Ja¤e (1986) and others in using the USPTOs (3-digit) technology classication system,
in the following way. First, each rm (i) is assigned a vector Ti that contains the number of patents
it was granted and classied in technology class k 2 f1; : : : ; g in its kth element, where  is
the number of technology classes utilized. The technological proximity between rms i and j is
calculated as the uncentered correlation between Ti and Tj : That is,
wij =
TiT
0
j
kTik kTjk (5)
Note that wij equals one if the distributions of patents across technology classes perfectly coincide
for the two rms, and it equals zero if the two rms never patent in the same USPTO technology
class.
For the study of geographic labor mobility, rms are matched to geographic information using
the rich detail of information contained in USPTO patent records. Firm activity often spans
various states, and most rms in the sample patent under di¤erent assignee names and di¤erent
locations. Each USPTO patent contains the state in which the patent application is led. This
allows observing the distribution of a the number of patents of the rm across US states. This
information is used for two purposes. First, in order to match rms to data on geographic mobility,
I assign each rm in the sample to the state in which its patents are most often classied9. Second,
I use it to dene and compute spillover pools in a way that is compatible with the geography of
rm activity. For this purpose, I construct an index of geographical concordance using the overlap
of rmspatenting activities across states. This is computed in similar vein to the technological
proximity metric, using the spread of each rms patents across U.S. states. For each rm, a 51-
vector (Gi for rm i) is constructed that contains the number of patents of the rm in state s in
its sth element. Geographic concordance of rms i and j are then calculated as the uncentered
correlation between Gi and Gj ,
gij =
GiG
0
j
kGik kGjk (6)
9An alternative to assigning a single state to each rm is to take weighted averages of state-level mobility rates
for each rm, using the proportion of the rms patents in each state as weights. I do not report results based on this
method since the resulting rm-specic "mobility" variable does not have an obvious interpretation. This alternative
"assignment" method does not change the main results of the paper.
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and the corresponding spillover pool is computed as
SPGK;it = log
P
j 6=i gijwijKjt (7)
Note that the technological proximity metric (wij) is incorporated into the computation of (7)
as well, since the technical similarity between the two rms is important for generating spillovers
beyond geography. Similar measures of geographic concordance are also used by Lychagin et al.
(2010) and Bloom et al. (2013).
To summarize, two di¤erent aggregation procedures are used, and three knowledge indicators
in each aggregation. Table 2 summarizes all six spillover variables, and Table 3 provides the names
and description of all variables that are used in the paper.
4 Data Sources and Key Variables
The main data sources of the study are the NBER patents and citations data le (Hall et al,
2001) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). These are supplemented with a coding of the
extent of non-compete enforcement across U.S. states constructed by Garmaise (2011) and Bird
and Knopf (2010). Finally, I use the information on concentration indices across 4-digit SIC industry
classications made available by the Census Bureaus Economic Census.
4.1 Mobility of Scientists and Engineers
My source for the rate of scientic labor mobility is the Current Population Surveys Annual
Demographic Files (March Supplement). The CPS March Supplement o¤ers an annual, nationally
representative sample of U.S. residents that consists of between 144,678 (in 1989) and 181,488
(1980) individual questionnaires. To construct mobility rates at various aggregations, I make use of
information on the number of employers the respondent worked for in the year preceding the survey,
the possible answers to which are f0; 1; 2; 3+g. I compute the fraction of scientic and technical
personnel that changed employers during the year in question, aggregated at sectoral classications
(similar to the ones used in Hall et al., 2005), and across U.S. states. My sample of scientic
and technical personnel follows the job classications used by Kim and Marschke (2005), and
are restricted to (Standard Occupation Codes in parentheses) engineers (044-059), mathematical
and computer scientists (064-068), natural scientists (069-083), clinical laboratory technologists
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and technicians (203), engineering and related technologists and technicians (213-216), science
technicians (223-225), and computer programmers (229).
Annual samples in the March Supplement contain between 2087 (in 1977) and 3181 (in 1990)
scientic personnel (55,754 total responders), representing between 2.9 to 5.4 million such occu-
pations, depending on the year. Between 225 and 427 sampled scientists changed jobs during the
year in question. The mobility rate of scientic personnel moves between 9% (in 1993) and 14.4%
(in 1990) over the sample period, which is lower than the mobility rate of the entire population
(between 13.1% in 1983 and 17% in 1979). This is likely to result from higher specialization and
job-specic knowledge of scientists and technicians.
The distribution of the sample of technical personnel into sectors and states is expectably
uneven. For a few number of sector-year pairs, the number of individuals in the CPS sample that
fall under the job classication used in the paper turn out to be quite low. This is especially true for
electrical machinery, and to some extent for the oil sector, for which the annual number of scientic
personnel frequently fall below 15. This produces a mobility rate that is unreliable, and is often
equal to zero, since none of the few scientists in the sample have changed jobs. An additional 13
sector-year pairs produce a zero scientic mobility rate. These sector-year pairs are removed from
the sample for the analyses on sectoral mobility. A similar situation exists for 41 state-year pairs,
which are removed from the sample used for geographic analyses. Since the CPS is a representative
sample of the entire U.S. residents, such cases indicate sectors and states that do not employ too
many scientic personnel, nor are heavily represented in the sample of patenting rms. Thus, any
sample selection bias due to these removals is likely to be negligible.
The CPS is useful in being a representative sample of scientists and engineers in the U.S.
Admittedly, however, the CPS sample gives an aggregate and noisy indicator of scientic labor
mobility. For instance, since my analyses focus on scientic personnel, the sample does not allow
reliable aggregation at the level of ner industry classications or ner geographic denitions, nor
it allows an analysis of mobility rates for each sector at each state. For each of these levels of
detail, the sample of scientists in the CPS becomes obstructively thin. An alternative to using the
CPS measure is to study USPTO patent records and track mobile inventors as they patent under
di¤erent a¢ liations (Singh and Agrawal, 2011; among others). However, inventors patent under
di¤erent a¢ liations due to many reasons other than a change of employer. Laforgia and Lissoni
(2009) nd that only about 12% of inventors that have two or more a¢ liations in patent records
can be classied as mobile, most multi-a¢ liation cases representing start-up ventures, mergers,
13
acquisitions, contract research, or consulting. Another limitation of inventor records is that one
can only observe technical personnel who has at least two patents (and patent under subsequent
employers). The sample of such inventors is likely to be a non-random sample of all scientic
personnel, introducing serious selection e¤ects. The CPS sample of scientists, on the other hand,
is representative of all scientists in the U.S. The current study complements the literature that
uses USPTO inventor records by using an alternative data source on scientic mobility, as well as
attempting to adress the provate value of scientic turnover.
Mobility is clearly pro-cyclical at the aggregate level. This is not surprising, but this will require
some additional robustness tests to ensure that the cyclical nature of the data is not driving the
main results.
4.2 Patents, Citations, and Firm Data
Patent and citation counts are taken from the NBER patent and citation database compiled by
Hall et al. (2001), and rm variables come from the Compustat data le compiled by the same
researchers. The NBER patent database consists of all patents granted by the USPTO between
the years 1965 and 2002, and all citations received by these patents up to 2002. The Compustat
data le consists of all manufacturing rms that are publicly traded in the U.S. The authors also
match assignee names used by the USPTO to the CUSIP rm identiers listed by Compustat for
over 700,000 patents. For further details, see Hall et al. (2001) and Ja¤e and Trajtenberg (2002).
Market value of the rm is the sum of common stock, preferred stock, and total debt net of
assets. Recall that R&D, patent and citation stocks are computed as perpetual inventories with
15% annual depreciation. When computing stocks, I do not extrapolate the missing initial values to
minus innity, since stock variables are constructed beginning 1967, while the rst year to be used
in computations is 1976. Hence, the e¤ect of the missing initial condition is likely to be negligible.
This approach is preferred since it avoids the additional noise due to imposing aggregate growth
rates for the variables in question on individual rms. Finally, citations are naturally truncated,
as they will keep coming long after data collection. I correct citation counts for truncation using
the correction weights given in Hall et al. (2001), which are obtained by estimating the citation
lag distribution for the six main technology classes.
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4.3 Competition
In order to obtain a measure of competition, I use measures of industry concentration in each
U.S. manufacturing industry from the Economic Census of the U.S. Census Bureau. The census
provides information on the Herndahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and the 4-rm (CR4) and 20-rm
(CR20) concentration ratios at the 4-digit SIC level. Concentration information for the papers
sample period is available in ve year intervals, at 1977, 1982 and 1987. Remaining years in the
dataset are assigned the concentration ratio in the earliest preceding survey year. The operations
of some of the rms in Compustat span several 4-digit SIC classications, and some operate in
more than one 3-digit SIC class. For these rms, Compustat reports a primary SIC code that ends
with one or two zeros, e¤ectively indicating a classication of rm activity at the three or 2-digit
SIC level. 40 rms in the nal sample can be assigned a 2-digit SIC code, and 354 rms a 3-digit
code. For these rms, I re-construct the HHI index at the 2 or 3 digit classication using the
information on the corresponding 4-digit classication available in the Economic Census. Simple
algebraic manipulation shows that the HHI concentration index in a 2-digit industry classication
(HHI2d) can be recovered from concentration indices of its 4-digit components (HHIk;4d), if one
has information on total sales in each 4-digit SIC category, as
HHI2d =
Xn(2d)
k=1
Sk
 2Xn(2d)
k=1
S2k HHIk;4d (8)
where n(2d) represents the number of 4-digit classications in the relevant 2-digit category, and
Sk and HHIk;4d are total sales (value of shipments) and industry concentration in the 4-digit
classication k = 1; :::; n(2d): The index at the necessary 3-digit classes are computed similarly.
The only available option for obtaining CR4 and CS20 at higher aggregation levels than the 4-digit
SIC is to take averages, or weighted averages of the index values for relevant sub-classes. Since the
construction of the HHI is more reliable than taking averages, reported results use HHI. Finally, an
index of competition is obtained by the logarithm of one minus the concentration index. Results
that deal with competition are robust to alternative concentration measures.
4.4 Final Samples
Firms that have no patents at any point between 1976 and 1993 are removed from the sample,
as well as sector-year or state-year pairs for which the sample of scientists and engineers in the
CPS data are very low or no mobility is observed (section 4.1). One year of observations per
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rm is sacriced in order to control for the pre-sample value, a lag of the dependent variable, and
industry growth. After these removals, cleaning large outliers, deleting observations outside the
desired time frame, and removing rms that appear only for a single year in the data, I am left
with an unbalanced panel of 12802 observations (1280 rms) for the sectoral mobility sample, and
11442 observations (1239 rms) for the geographic mobility sample, spanning a 17 year interval
from 1977 to 1993. The average number of years a rm appears in the former (resp. latter) sample
data is 10 (resp. 9.23), with a standard deviation of 5.2 (resp. 4.2) years. Samples for the study
of competition are further reduced to 12283 and 11002, respectively, due to missing values for the
Herndahl-Hirschman concentration index. Table 4 reports sample statistics for the main variables.
Sample correlations between key variables are reported in Tables 5 and 6. All current dollar values
are deated using the GNP deator. All "external" variables are computed by using the total
sample of rms in Compustat, not just those that are in the nal sample.
5 Estimation and Results
5.1 Econometric Issues
An important issue in the estimation of (3) is the presence of permanent rm e¤ects that are
correlated with independent variables. In general, controlling for permanent e¤ects proves to be a
di¢ cult task in estimating variants of these equations, and the literature often resorts to pooled OLS
without any attempt to account for them. There are numerous problems related to the presence of
permanent rm e¤ects, and methods that remove them. First, I have right hand side variables that
are very persistent, both by their nature and also by construction. Thus, any method that directly
eliminates permanent e¤ects removes too much variation10. Second, R&D expenditures (therefore
R&D stocks) are prone to measurement error for various reasons (Grilliches and Hausman, 1986),
an important one being underreporting by rms. Any method that controls for xed e¤ects by
di¤erencing (rst di¤erencing, or di¤erencing from means) is bound to exacerbate the bias due to
measurement error. Third, most of the variation in the data set is in the cross section11. Due to these
reasons, standard xed e¤ects methods tend to be uninformative. Standard GMM methods that
10 In addition, Tobins q is persistent in the long run as well. See Salinger (1984), who uses Tobins q as a measure
of long term monopoly power.
11Hall and Vopel (1997) make a case against controlling for unobserved rm e¤ects by arguing that "most of the
reasons why there exist permanent di¤erences across rms in the market value equation can be attributed to R&D
and/or market share (ed., one of their controls that is not the focus of the current paper), and we would like to
measure these di¤erences rather than simply di¤erencing them away".
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rely on di¤erencing also produce unreliable results for similar reasons (Mairesse and Hall, 1996).
Due to the persistence of right hand side variables, usual instruments tend to be weakly correlated
with the endogenous variables in the rst-di¤erenced equation (Blundell and Bond, 2000).
To deal with these issues, I use a GMM-IV estimator in the tradition of Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000). This method is particularly useful when one needs
to control for individual e¤ects in the presence of measurement error and persistent right hand
side variables. It imposes weak restrictions on the permanent e¤ects (i.e., mean stationarity)
and makes use of the resulting moment conditions that allow the use of lagged di¤erences as
instruments for the equation in levels. Blundell and Bond (2000) argue that these additional
instruments are particularly attractive under autoregressive errors, and report highly favorable
Monte Carlo simulations, especially in cases where the standard rst-di¤erenced equation performs
poorly12. The validity of the Arellano and Bover (1995) instruments critically rests on the lack of
serial correlation in residuals. For this reason, I study regressions that condition on the immediate
past by including a lagged dependent variable. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable
introduces well-known complications, and additional instruments need to be used to account for
the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable to obtain consistent estimates.
By instrumenting rm level variables, I also control for the potential endogeneity of the rms
own knowledge assets. It is easy to argue that R&D stock is endogenous in equation (3), since
successful rms will adjust the intensity of their R&D e¤orts accordingly. Thus, market value
causes R&D as well. Citation stocks (citation stock/patent stock in the regression equation) are
less prone to such reverse causality since these capture the output of R&D activity, which has a
large component that isnt in direct control of the rm, as indicated by the value distribution of
patents and that of citations received.
5.2 Instruments for Mobility
There are numerous reasons to suspect the presence of reverse causality from market value to
mobility, rendering the mobility term endogenous in equation (3). For instance, market value can
directly cause labor mobility through increased layo¤s during times of declining rm performance.
More importantly, when rms in a given sector are doing collectively better, the average market
12For recent applications of this method in a similar framework, see Blundell, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (1999) and
OMahony and Vecchi (2009) for an application of the system GMM estimator. The latter deals with the measurement
of spillover e¤ects in a production function framework. Also see Hahn (1999) for a discussion on the e¢ ciency gains
resulting from this method.
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value of rms can cause higher mobility due to increased on-the-job search. In order to achieve
the causal relationship in the direction I seek, additional instruments are employed for the sectoral
and geographic mobility rates, in addition to the GMM procedure described above. For sectoral
mobility rates, I follow Kim and Marschke (2005) in using the logarithms of the fraction of male and
white scientists and the average age of scientists as instruments for the mobility rate. Additionally,
I use the fraction of scientists in the sector that are married, and the fraction that do not live alone
as instruments.
For the geographic mobility variable, I also use the cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in
the extent of non-compete enforcement across and within U.S. states as an instrument, in addition
to the personal characteristics (gender, race, age, marital status and living situation) of the sample
of scientists at the state level. Garmaise (2011) constructs an index that measures the strictness of
NCC enforcement in each state (and DC) for each year between 1992 and 2004. To construct the
index, Garmaise uses a set of 12 questions taken from Malsberger (2004), and assigns 1 point to
the state if the aspect of NCC enforcement addressed by the question exceeds a given threshold13.
Bird and Knopf (2010) use the same methodology to extend the Garmaise index to cover the period
1976-1994. The index takes integer values between 0 and 12. Two states (California and North
Dakota) whose legal codes ban the enforcement of these contracts are assigned the lowest score of 0,
while the highest enforcement score over the sample period 1977 to 1993 is 7 (Missouri, Tennessee,
DC, and Florida after 1991). The variation in enforcement stems from the di¤erences in the scope
of enforcement, i.e., conditions under which state statute and courts uphold the contract, and the
index reects this variation. Various changes in enforcement are observed during the sample period,
most signicant ones of which occurred in Michigan (0 to 5 in 1985) and Louisiana (1 to 4 in 1989).
There are minor disagreements between the Bird and Knopf (2010) and Garmaise (2011) codings,
but using alternative codings do not alter the results presented in the current paper. Reported
results use the former (Bird and Knopf) coding in cases of disagreement.
The validity of these instruments are easy to demonstrate. A regression of Mht on the set of
instruments reveal that they are signicant individually and collectively, with F -statistic above 100
for both the sectoral and geographic mobility rates, and jointly explain around 10% of the variation
in sectoral labor mobility. A similar exercise is also undertaken using the original respondents as
units, where "having changed employer" is a dichotomous binary variable. These analysis conrm
the same result, with F -statistics above 300. The strictness of non-compete enforcement reduces
13See Garmaise (2011) Appendix for the list of questions and corresponding thresholds.
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mobility. Older and married scientic personnel, and those living with someone are less mobile,
while males and whites change employers more frequently. The validity of instruments will be
demonstrated by the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. Results are also robust to using
subsets of instruments in each regression.
5.3 Alternative Explanations and Confounders
Drawing from the literature on the sources of knowledge ows, a central interest of the paper is
the value of knowledge ows that occur via scientic labor mobility. On the other hand, labor
mobility can a¤ect market value through various additional mechanisms. First, the loss of a crit-
ical scientist doesnt only represent loss of knowledge, but also of human capital. Second, under
loose employer-employee ties, employees may be less inclined to invest in rm-specic skills, un-
derstanding that their careers are only weakly tied to their current employer (Fallick et al., 2006).
Since controlling for direct measures of human capital or employee investment is elusive, the cur-
rent paper does not make an attempt to disentangle the separate e¤ects through each of these
channels, but report a joint estimate of all. On the other hand, increased labor mobility can have
additional benets for the rm as the costs of searching for and nding talent will be lower, and
critical vacancies can be lled sooner. My estimates are likely to partially reect the quality of the
labor force in question, as the prospect of mobility may attract more talented personnel from other
sectoral (Marx, 2011) or geographic markets (Marx et al., 2012). To address these possibilities, I
estimate additional specications that include the rate of aggregate labor mobility (mobility rate
of all employed, excluding scientists and engineers) in the relevant labor market as an additional
regressor. The estimated negative e¤ects of mobility, on the other hand, include the joint e¤ects of
misappropriation, outbound human capital, and other e¤ects of loose employer-employee ties.
In addition, mobility can a¤ect market value by altering the productivity of the rms own R&D
capital. As internal R&D capital gets larger, so would the detrimental e¤ects of misappropriation
due to mobility. On the other hand, the rms R&D capital presumably increases the rms
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). I investigate the overall e¤ects of mobility due
to such channels by estimating additional regressions that include an interaction of mobility with
internal R&D stock/Assets ( eRit). The choice of eRit as opposed to directly using R&D stock or
annual R&D expenditures owes to the specication of the market value equations (2) and (3) in
which eRit is the proper measure of internal R&D capital.
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5.4 Additional Issues
Equation (3) is motivated by resorting to the argument that external knowledge assets create value
for rms, and scientic mobility is expected to be instrumental in drawing value from external
knowledge. A strict interpretation of the market value equation, however, reveals a set of underlying
assumptions that are not completely realistic: that inventors observe external knowledge assets and
the mobility rate in relevant labor markets, and price the rms assets accordingly. My defense
against this is two-fold. First, di¤erences over time and across markets in the rate of scientic
mobility may reect observable knowledge-di¤using attributes of sectoral and geographic labor
markets in question. Therefore, the potential for knowledge ows, and channels by which they
occur can be treated as an important intangible asset for the rm. For instance, mobility may act
as insurance against lagging behind competitors and signal a competitive technological position for
the future to potential investors. Second, mobility does not create a one-time transfer of knowledge,
but creates long-lasting links between the source and the target (Agrawal et al., 2003), which renders
its e¤ects to some extent observable.
Another important problem is how one should interpret signicant coe¢ cients for the spillover
and mobility terms. A signicant coe¢ cient for the interaction term, or the mobility term can
result from potential co-movements within an industry, or patterns of change in technological
opportunities in the same industry over time. To account for these possibilities, I include the total
sales within the 4-digit SIC class, which controls for demand e¤ects and for changes in various
industrial conditions. Permanent industry e¤ects are controlled by dummies for sectors. I also
include the logarithm of the rms own sales to account for possible size e¤ects. Also, the coe¢ cient
of the interaction term in (3) may be positive if either component picks up the e¤ects of aggregate
or industrial economic conditions (Grilliches, 1992). Recall that labor mobility is pro-cyclical, and
the sizes of spillover pools may also correlate with business cycles. In order to address these issues,
I check the robustness of coe¢ cients to the inclusion of the growth rate in the industry (current
or lagged), and GDP growth rate in the U.S. during the year in question. Results also hold when
these terms are interacted with labor mobility and spillover pools to further test whether they will
pick up the variation formerly explained by mobility terms (See Appendix).
A nal caveat for the methodology that I use is that coe¢ cients of spillover terms are likely
include the e¤ects of positive spillovers as well as negative competitive e¤ects. These coe¢ cients
reect the combination of both, and they will at best be lower bounds for the true spillover e¤ect.
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Bloom et al (2013) attempt to identify these two e¤ects, using the Ja¤e (1986) technological prox-
imity metric along with a measure of product market closeness between any two rms. They nd
that both e¤ects are present, but the negative e¤ect due to product market competition tends to
be much lower than positive spillover e¤ects.
Table A1 in the Appendix walks the reader through a specication search, by reporting relevant
regression results at each step towards the nal specication. These analyses demonstrate the need
for each of the decisions made, and illustrate the robustness of the papers main results to alternative
estimation strategies.
5.5 Results
Table 7 reports estimates for the main specication in equation (3). Columns 1 through 3 study
scientic mobility at the sectoral level, while columns 4 through 6 turn to geographic labor mobility.
Each column uses one of the six spillover measures that were previously introduced. All regressions
include a full set of year dummies, and dummies for industry sectors. Columns 4 through 6
additionally employ state dummies. All estimates are from two-step GMM14.
In all regressions, the spillover pools, the interaction between mobility and the spillover pool,
and the separate mobility term are statistically signicant at all reasonable levels of signicance.
The estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term has a positive sign, while the mobility term alone
has a negative sign in all specications. This is consistent with the expected e¤ects of labor
mobility on rm performance, and the trade-o¤s discussed in the Introduction can be observed
in regression results. The positive sign of the interaction term indicates that rms with a high
amount of externally created knowledge in their disposal benet from increased labor turnover,
while the negative sign of the mobility term shows that there is an adverse e¤ect of mobility to
rms that lack large external knowledge stocks. The latter adverse e¤ect is likely to stem from looser
appropriability conditions in a highly mobile scientic labor market and the resulting outbound
intellectual and human capital. Note that this is true holding key industry characteristics constant,
and with the presence of year and sector dummies15.
14OLS estimates for all specications are available upon request from the author.
15The coe¢ cients of either mobility term do not change considerably with the inclusion of industry characteristics
and sector/state dummies, indicating that these coe¢ cients are not a¤ected by sector and year e¤ects. Results are
also robust to the use of industry dummies at the 4-digit SIC level instead of sector dummies. In OLS regressions,
I also observe that further controlling for dummies for each sector-year pair reduces the (negative) coe¢ cient of the
separate mobility term, while not a¤ecting the interaction term signicantly. These interaction dummies are not used
in main results since they make the inversion of the second stage GMM instrument matrix problematic.
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The elasticity of Tobins q with respect to mobility is given by (note that the mobility term is
already in logs)
@ log qit
@Mht
= bMSSP hK;it| {z }
+
+ bM|{z}
 
(9)
which can be used to calculate marginal e¤ects of the mobility rate for di¤erent values of SP hK;it: It
is instructive to look at the composition of the elasticity (9) into its positive (from the interaction
term) and negative (from the separate mobility term) components. I interpret the former as the
increase in market value due to the spillovers that occur through labor mobility, while the latter
represents losses endured due to increased mobility. Evaluated at the mean spillover pool, the
former ranges from 0:101 (column 1) to 0:314 (column 6). These are the contributions of the
interaction term alone on the elasticity above. The contribution of the standalone mobility term
on (9) ranges from  0:196 (column 1) to  0:754 (column 5). To put more substance into these
numbers, note that the mean sectoral (resp. geographic) mobility rate over the entire sample is
0:101 (resp. 0:116). Thus, if one wants to convert the elasticity values above to the e¤ects of a
percentage point increase in the mobility rate (i.e., the e¤ects of one additional job change for
every 100 scientist), they need to be multiplied by (0:101) 1 for the sectoral rate, and by (0:116) 1
for the geographic rate, to get the aforementioned value at mean mobility. This implies that the
positive impact of a percentage point increase in the mobility rate on market value ranges from
1:98% to 6:51%, with the corresponding negative impacts having magnitudes  1:94% and  6:79%.
The positive and negative portions of (9) are very close to one another for sectoral mobility, and
net e¤ects remain between 0:04% (column 1) and 0:16% (column 2). For the geographic rates (and
matching spillover pools) the wedge between the two are larger, but net e¤ects remain much smaller
than the magnitudes of each, which is between  0:27% (column 5) and  0:48% (column 6). It
appears that the impact of labor mobility through spillovers is substantial, but is countered by a
negative e¤ect of similar magnitude. Net e¤ects remain small, if not negligible. The e¤ects implied
by geographic mobility (and the relevant spillover pools) are larger than the corresponding e¤ects
for sectoral mobility. Geographic mobility rates also give negative net e¤ects that are larger in
magnitude. These marginal e¤ects for all six specications from Table 7 are summarized at Table
8.
To get a more complete picture, one can look at marginal e¤ects at di¤erent quintiles of the
spillover pools. For instance, a rm that has access to the spillover pool at the third quartile
enjoys net returns as high as 1:01% of market value, due to the aforementioned increase in labor
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mobility. The same return from sectoral mobility range between 0:12% and 0:53%, while geographic
aggregation produces net e¤ects in between 0:66% and 1:01%: At the 90th percentile of the spillover
pool, net e¤ects measure as high as 1:55% (column 6, geographic mobility) of market value. Net
e¤ects due to geographic mobility, again, are larger than those due to sectoral mobility.
Finally, using estimated coe¢ cients in Table 7, it is also possible to compute the fraction of the
overall spillover e¤ect
bSSP hK;it + bMSMht  SP hK;it that occurs due to scientic mobility. Holding
spillover pools constant at the mean, a one standard deviation increase in the rate of scientic
mobility creates spillovers that measure as much as 17:6% (column 1) of the total spillover e¤ect.
This minimum value for this percentage is 13:6% (column 5). This percentage reaches levels as high
as 42:7% (column 4) if the mobility rate increases from its minimum sample value to its sample
average.
The negative e¤ect of mobility reported in Table 7 deserves further scrutiny. Table 9 investi-
gates the potential sources of this negative e¤ect, and provides some additional robustness checks.
I have interpreted the negative e¤ect of the standalone mobility terms in Table 7 as the loss of
critical knowledge and human capital via scientic mobility. If this interpretation is correct, then
one would also expect losing critical knowledge assets and human capital to a close competitor to be
more harmful than it is to a non-rival company. Hence, holding positive spillover e¤ects constant,
we expect the detrimental e¤ect to be larger in industries with more head-to-head competition.
Columns 1 (sectoral mobility) and 4 (geographic mobility) in Table 9 test this prediction by includ-
ing the interaction of scientic mobility with a measure of competition at the relevant SIC class
for each rm. I measure competition by (the logarithm of) one minus the Herndahl-Hirschman
index of concentration. As expected, the interaction term has a negative and signicant coe¢ cient
in both specications. Hence, the negative e¤ect of scientic mobility is more pronounced for rms
operating in more competitive environments, supporting the hypothesis that my estimates capture
the e¤ects of misappropriation and the loss of critical resources.
The results of the paper rely on measures of mobility computed for specic job classications,
representing the sample of scientic and technical personnel in the Current Population Survey.
While results are robust to controlling for industrial and aggregate economic uctuations (Table
A1), it is still possible that the scientic mobility rate acts as a proxy for the aggregate rate of
mobility in the relevant sector or state. In order to make sure that estimates are due to the
mobility of scientic personnel, columns 2 and 5 include (the logarithm of) the aggregate rate of
employer-to-employer mobility in the relevant sector-year or the state-year. Aggregate mobility
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also controls for the potential benets of a mobile labor market, such as lower costs and delays for
lling vacancies, and the overall quality of the relevant labor force. This rate is computed for all
employed personnel in the CPS sample, excluding the sample of scientists and engineers. The sign
of the aggregate mobility rate is negative and statistically insignicant in both specications, and
does not alter the coe¢ cient of either mobility term signicantly.
Furthermore, it is possible to expect scientic mobility to create or destroy rm value by op-
erating through the rms own R&D e¤ort, for two reasons. First, the larger the rms own R&D
capital, the larger the potential for loss due to looser appropriability conditions as scientic labor
markets become more mobile. Second, the rms R&D stock may increase the rms ability to
internalize and use external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Thus, the potential e¤ect
of an interaction of mobility with a measure of internal R&D capital is theoretically ambiguous.
The net e¤ect of such a variable is investigated in columns 3 and 6 of Table 9, by including the
interaction of scientic mobility with eRit (R&D stock/Assets). In general, I nd that estimation
with additional terms including the rms endogenous internal assets tend to be complicated, and
it is di¢ cult to keep the parameters of diagnostic tests within acceptable limits. Note that a major
di¢ culty in the estimation of (3) is the instrumentation of R&D stocks (Appendix), hence it is not
surprising that further parameters including an interaction with this variable creates additional
di¢ culties. For this reason, I seek the e¤ect of a mobility  eRit 1 interaction, with the R&D
variable lagged for one year. Even with this specication, estimation proves di¢ cult, and I can
reject serial correlation in residuals only at the 7 or 8% signicance (p = 0:075 in column 3 and
0:061 in column 6). The coe¢ cient of this interaction term is positive but it is insignicant at
all reasonable levels of statistical signicance. It may be the case that the benecial (absorptive
capacity) and detrimental (larger loss potential) e¤ects for rms with larger R&D intensities are
present, but cancel each other out. Nevertheless, it is clear that rms with larger R&D intensity
do not benet or lose more due to an increase in the rate of scientic mobility.
6 Conclusion
This paper studied the relationship between scientic labor mobility and market value, producing,
for the rst time, estimates of the net value of the mobility of scientic personnel, as well as the
resulting knowledge ows. I document distinct positive and negative e¤ects of scientic mobility
on market value, and discuss the implications of each. The private value of knowledge transfers
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that occur through labor mobility is statistically and economically signicant. According to my
estimates, private gains due to knowledge ows associated with one job movement per 100 scientists
are between about 2% and 6.5% of the rms market value, depending on the specication used.
Another question of interest is the net private returns, or losses to innovative rms that operate in
industries with highly mobile labor markets. It has been considered puzzling that highly innovative
rms choose to locate in close proximity to their rivals, facilitating the transfer of their scientic
labor force to competitors. I nd negative e¤ects of mobility that are likely to represent such losses,
which are of similar magnitudes to the positive e¤ects of knowledge ows. Hence, my results suggest
that on average, rms tend to "break even" if the labor market they hire from becomes more mobile.
While the negative e¤ect of mobility is higher for rms in more competitive industries, rms with
larger internal R&D do not su¤er or gain more due to labor mobility, compared to others. These
results highlight individual, rm-level incentives for operating in a highly mobile labor market, and
provide rm-level evidence for the labor pooling motivation for industrial agglomeration. In terms
of its policy implications, the evidence is supportive of legal remedies that facilitate the mobility
of employees, as previous evidence has repeatedly suggested.
I have taken care to exclude alternative explanations for the main results of the paper. Most
importantly, my main results and arguments remain valid when potential e¤ects of industrial and
aggregate economic conditions are accounted for, and the rate of scientic labor mobility rate is
instrumented. This suggests that estimated coe¢ cients and elasticities are, to a large extent, due
to the mobility of engineers and scientists in the rms immediate sectoral environment, rather
than being artifacts of external economic conditions, such as recessions and booms, or industrial
expansion and decline.
My estimates are obtained using a large panel of U.S. manufacturing rms that spans a large
variety of 4-digit SIC classications. One would expect the impact of labor mobility to be higher
for high-tech and R&D intensive industries, and industries that are at earlier stages of their life
cycle. Gaining insight about these additional hypotheses require more detailed data on scientist
turnover, and are exciting avenues of research in this area.
Acknowledgement: TBA.
7 Appendix
- Table A1 here -
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Table A1 progressively reports estimates from various methods, in order to illustrate the prob-
lems in estimating (3) and how each of these problems are dealt with. I present these results also
to illustrate the performance of the various methods used, their e¤ect on model parameters, and
the robustness of the papers main results to various empirical choices made. All regressions use
the sectoral mobility rate and SPSCITE;it as a measure for the spillover pool, but the progression
of estimates is similar for other specications. Columns 1 through 3 in Table 6 treat the mobility
rate as exogenous, while columns 4 through 8 treat it as an endogenous variable. I explore di¤erent
GMM specications that instrument rm level variables with appropriate lags of either levels or
di¤erences of regressors. In particular, columns 3 through 8 use the Arellano and Bover (1995)
suggestion of instrumenting the levels equation by lags of di¤erences of endogenous regressors. In
all specications I assume external and industry-level variables to be exogenous. Indicators of the
rms internal knowledge assets treated as endogenous in all columns. All estimates use two-step
GMM.
Column 1 uses lagged levels dated t 2 through t 8 of rm level variables as instruments for the
levels equation. An important feature of these estimates (and also those in the main text) is that
the coe¢ cient of the R&D term is lower than its estimates from the literature that estimate similar
specications for U.S. data (for a review of the pre-1999 literature and estimated coe¢ cients, see
Hall, 1999) by an order of multiple magnitudes. There is a similar situation for the coe¢ cient of
citation stock/patent stock ratio. However, the Sargan test statistic strongly rejects the validity
of these instruments (2(165) = 231:88; p = 0:00). In particular, no subset of lagged levels proves
to be a valid instrument set for the R&D term. The implied correlation between lagged levels and
residuals suggest that permanent rm e¤ects are present, and that they are not fully accounted for.
On a side note, the mobility terms have comparable signs and magnitudes with t-statistics similar
to those in the papers main results.
Column 2 reports results from an extended system-GMM estimation that estimates a stacked
system of equations including both the levels equation and the equation in rst di¤erences, with
the instrumentation methodology described above. This method results in somewhat di¤erent
estimates for the coe¢ cients of key variables, but the set of instruments are strongly rejected by
the Sargan test (2(292) = 389:98; p = 0:00). This is mainly due to the fact that nding valid
instruments for the di¤erenced R&D term proves to be elusive.
Column 3 uses lagged di¤erences (dated t   2 through t   8) of the main rm level variables
as instruments in the levels equation. I observe that lagged di¤erences dated t  1 are never valid
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instruments, while the validity of di¤erences dated t   2 is also rejected in some specications.
These observations are consistent with the presence of measurement error.
To justify the use of lagged di¤erences as instruments in the levels equation, Arellano and Bover
(1995) make the stationarity assumption
E (xiti) = wi 6= 0 for t = 1; 2; :::; T (10)
where xit denotes a generic regressor. That is, regressors are allowed to be correlated with perma-
nent e¤ects, but their covariance is assumed to be constant over time. Then, (10) implies the set
of moment conditions
E [xiti] = wi   wi = 0 (11)
which suggests the instrumentation discussed above. Note that (10) can also be expressed as
a restriction on the initial condition alone. For an extended discussion on this assumption, see
Arellano and Bover (1995), and Arellano (2003).
These additional instruments are not rejected by the Sargan test statistic (2(166) = 154:97;
p = 0:418). Therefore, this methodology is adopted as the preferred estimator for the rest of
paper. The lack of correlation between lagged di¤erences and residuals, along with the apparent
correlation between lagged levels and residuals indicates that xed e¤ects are indeed present and
are not accounted for in the previous specications. On the other hand, it should be noted that the
m1 and m2 test statistics (Arellano and Bond, 1991) suggest that there is still autocorrelation in
the residuals, which can arise due to the presence of permanent rm e¤ects. Thus, further attention
to the serial correlation properties of errors is called for. This point will be discussed in further
detail below.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of the mobility term, column 4 instruments the mobility
term in addition to the rm level variables. Additional instruments used are the logarithm of the
average age of scientists working in the industry sector, and the logarithms of the fraction of males,
and the fraction of those that are married and do not live alone. These additional instruments
prove to be valid (2(154) = 165:60; p = 0:247). Interestingly, this method gives coe¢ cients for the
mobility and interaction terms that are higher in magnitude than previous estimates, conrming
the suspicion that there exists positive reverse causality from market value to mobility.
A potentially important problem with the regressions in columns 1 through 4 is that the er-
ror term is serially correlated, as indicated by the m1 and m2 test statistics of Arellano and Bond
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(1991). These are tests for the lack of rst and second order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced
residuals, respectively. If model residuals are not serially correlated, we would expect to see strong
evidence for negative rst order serial correlation (cov (uit;uit 1) =  var (uit 1)), but no ev-
idence for second order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals (cov (uit;uit 2) = 0
if E (uituit  ) = 0 for all  > 0). Note that serially correlated residuals in panel data can arise if
there are permanent e¤ects that are not fully accounted for. Hence, this issue needs to be addressed
in order to achieve consistent estimates.
To account for the serial correlation in the residuals, column 5 introduces a pre-sample value
of the dependent variable as an additional regressor. While the pre-sample value of log q is highly
signicant, this makes little di¤erence in the test statistics m1 and m2. Column 6 includes a lagged
dependent variable for the same purpose, which is instrumented by its lagged di¤erences dated t 2
and t  3. The set of instruments are still jointly valid (2(179) = 199:31; p = 0:142), while residuals
do not show any sign of serial correlation. First-di¤erenced residuals exhibit strong negative serial
correlation. As opposed to the estimates in columns 1-5, no evidence is found for second order
serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals, indicating that all permanent e¤ects have been
properly accounted for. The signs and signicance of main coe¢ cients of interest remain robust to
the inclusion of log qi;t 1.
As previously argued, main results of the paper can be driven by aggregate or industrial eco-
nomic conditions if either the mobility rate or spillover pools pick up e¤ects due to business cycles,
or industrial expansion or decline. In addition to the controls previously described to control for
such e¤ects (section 5.4), columns 7 and 8 provide additional robustness tests on the specication
in column 6. Column 7 includes the aggregate GDP growth rate in United States during the rele-
vant year, while column 8 includes terms that interact GDP growth with mobility and the spillover
pool. The aim is to see whether these additional interactions will pick up the variation previously
explained by mobility-spillover interactions. Results in column 6 remain robust to the inclusion
of these terms, but the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients of both mobility terms are smaller. Similar
observations apply when the industrial growth rate is used in interaction terms instead of GDP
growth.
Finally, the specication in column 7 of Table A1 is used in all main regressions reported in the
paper.
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Table 1 
Sector classifications for the mobility variable 
Sector  1 Paper and Printing 
 2 Chemicals (excluding Drugs) 
 3 Rubber 
 4 Wood and Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
 5 Primary Metal 
 6 Fabricated Metal 
 7 Machinery 
 8 Electrical Machinery 
 9 Autos 
 10 Air & Boat 
 11 Textiles and Leather 
 12 Drugs 
 13 Food 
 14 Computers and Instruments 
 15 Oil 
   
 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary of external knowledge assets (spillover pools) used 
  Sectoral Aggregation:  
Uses technological proximity 
Geographic Aggregation: 
Uses geographic and technological proximity 
R&D Stock 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖 ∈𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  = � 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖  
Citation Stock 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖 ∈𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  = � 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖  
Citation St./ 
Patent St. 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ �𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒𝐒(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  = � 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∙ �𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖  
 
  
 
 
 
Table 3 
Variable names and definitions 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  Market value (of firm 𝑖𝑖 at year 𝑖𝑖) 
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  Knowledge assets, generic 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  Ordinary physical assets 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  Tobin’s 𝑄𝑄 
𝜎𝜎 Returns to assets  
𝛾𝛾 Shadow value of knowledge assets relative to ordinary assets 
  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  R&D stock 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  R&D expenditures (flow) 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  Patent stock 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  Citation stock 
𝑅𝑅�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  R&D stock/Assets 
?̃?𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  Citation stock/Patent stock 
  
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
ℎ  Spillover pool available to firm 𝑖𝑖 at year 𝑖𝑖, at aggregation level ℎ 
 All use technological proximity, along with geographic concordance metrics or sector restrictions:  
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  External R&D stock, within sector 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  External citation stock, within sector 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  External citation yield, within sector 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  External R&D stock, agg. w.r.t. tech. and geog. proximity 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  External citation stock, agg. w.r.t. tech. and geog. proximity 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  External citation yield, agg. w.r.t. tech. and geog. proximity 
𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑖𝑖  Logarithm of the scientific mobility rate (sector or state ℎ at year 𝑖𝑖) 
  
 
Table 4 
Sample Statistics 
     
 
Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Market Value 1303.68 146.64 4756.07 0.16 120756.52 
Net Capital 1262.25 120.84 4904.05 0.39 106569.91 
Tobin's q 1.553 1.086 1.547 0.002 14.942 
R&D Stock 189.74 12.88 998.01 0 25763.63 
Patent Stock 84.49 7.6 289.41 0 5849.16 
Citation Stock 1012.39 86.67 4246.46 0 140330.78 
R&D/Assets 0.26 0.121 0.533 0 16.617 
Citation Stock/Patent Stock 11.716 9.484 11.115 0 174.4 
Sectoral Mobility  0.101 0.102 0.041 0.021 0.381 
Geographic Mobility  0.116 0.111 0.041 0.019 0.364 
Aggregate Mobility (Sectoral) 0.118 0.118 0.031 0.042 0.278 
Aggregate Mobility (Geographical) 0.148 0.146 0.027 0.088 0.240 
      
Spillover Pools (in logs) 
     Sector 
(Tech. Proximity) R&D Stock 7.011 7.397 2.022 -1.614 10.789 
 
Citation Stock 8.842 9.062 1.846 1.373 12.685 
 
Citation St./Patent St. 4.391 4.425 1.312 -3.073 7.090 
Geography 
(Tech and Geog. 
Proximity) R&D Stock 7.052 7.294 1.611 -1.674 10.457 
 
Citation Stock 8.744 9.001 1.481 -2.416 11.849 
 
Citation St./Patent St. 3.745 3.934 1.337 -8.819 12.092 
Sales 1749.82 220.37 6893.08 0.33 164933.14 
Industry Sales 21457.75 4868.13 71771.53 50.49 752738.16 
Industry Growth 0.03 0.028 0.209 -0.839 8.627 
I (R&D Expenditures=0) (flow) 0.204 0 0.403 0 1 
Competition (1 - HHI) 0.94 0.96 0.06 0.73 0.99 
      
Instruments (Geographic Aggregates) 
     NCC Enforcement 3.74 4 2.12 0 7 
Age 37.92 37.93 1.57 28.42 43.79 
Male 0.78 0.79 0.06 0.42 0.95 
White 0.90 0.91 0.06 0.27 1 
Married 0.69 0.69 0.07 0.30 0.93 
Not alone 0.68 0.68 0.07 0.30 0.93 
      CPS Sample 
     From individual survey data,  
sample of scientists and engineers.  
     Mobility 0.11 0 0.32 0 1 
Age 38.05 36 11.49 14 90 
Male 0.78 1 0.42 0 1 
White 0.9 1 0.3 0 1 
Married 0.7 1 0.46 0 1 
Not alone 0.69 1 0.46 0 1 
NOTES:  All dollar values are in millions of 1992 dollars, deflated using the GNP deflator.  All logarithms are natural 
logs. Sample size: 12802 for the sectoral, and 11442 for the geographic mobility samples. Sample period: 1977-
1993. Only geographic aggregates of main instruments are reported to save space. 
 
  
Table 5 
Sample correlations between key variables 
Variables Abbr. 𝑅𝑅� ?̃?𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺  𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆  Comp logS logIS IG 
log (q) log (q) 0,272 0,287 0,094 0,043 0,037 -0,089 0,065 -0,012 -0,153 -0,085 0,114 
R&D/Assets 𝑅𝑅� . 0,259 0,178 0,044 0,004 -0,120 0,032 -0,098 -0,204 -0,055 0,065 
Citation Stock/Patent Stock ?̃?𝐶 
 
. 0,167 0,038 0,014 -0,065 0,044 -0,021 -0,073 -0,066 0,080 
Spillover Pool: Geog. R&D 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺  
  
. -0,036 -0,098 -0,212 -0,099 -0,135 0,265 0,168 0,022 
Scientific Mobility (Sector) 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
   
. 0,121 0,424 0,162 0,071 -0,073 -0,087 0,038 
Scientific Mobility (State) 𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆  
    
. 0,149 0,469 -0,036 0,003 0,021 0,016 
Aggregate Mobility (Sector) 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  
     
. 0,278 0,157 -0,023 -0,150 0,045 
Aggregate Mobility (State) 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆  
      
. -0,046 0,020 0,044 0,040 
Competition: log (1-HHI) Comp 
      
 . -0,074 -0,243 -0,023 
log (Sales) logS 
      
  . 0,475 -0,042 
log (Industry Sales) logIS 
      
   . -0,008 
Industry Growth IG 
      
    . 
 
 
      
    
 NOTE: Only one spillover pool measure in included, external R&D stocks aggregated using geographical and technological proximity (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 ). 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Sample correlations between measures for the spillover pool 
 Technological Aggregates (within sector)  Technological and Geographic Aggregates 
 R&D Stock Citation Stock 
Citation St./ 
Patent St.  R&D Stock Citation Stock 
Citation St./ 
Patent St. 
Technological Aggregates 
(within sector) 
       
R&D Stock . 0.975 0.759  0,582 0,579 0,489 
Citation Stock  . 0.817  0,577 0,592 0,509 
Citation St./Patent St.   .  0,469 0,493 0,527 
        
Tech. and Geographic Aggregates        
R&D Stock     . 0,972 0,881 
Citation Stock      . 0,919 
Citation St./Patent St.       . 
        
 
 Table 7 
GMM regressions  
Dependent variable: log (𝑽𝑽𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊/𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) 
 
Sectoral Mobility of Scientific Personnel  Geographic Mobility of Scientific Personnel 
Spillover pools are aggregated within sector, 
using technological proximity 
Spillover pools are aggregated using 
technological and geographic proximity 
 
(1)  
SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  (2)  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  (3)  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆   (4)  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  (5)  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  (6)  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  
        
R&D / Assets 0.04040         
(9.83)         
0.04016         
(9.80)         
0.04059         
(9.97)         
 0.04326 
(8.59) 
0.04493 
(8.69) 
0.04382 
(8.20) 
Citations / Patents -0.00161         
(-2.26)         
-0.00153         
(-2.16)         
-0.00157         
(-2.18)         
 -0.00076 
(-1.04) 
-0.00058 
(-0.81) 
-0.00064 
(-0.90) 
Spillover Pool 0.06068         
(2.94)         
0.07903         
(3.11)         
0.17275         
(3.83)         
 0.15200 
(3.63) 
0.19546 
(3.64) 
0.22194 
(4.09) 
Scientific Mobility  
× Spillover Pool 
0.02849         
(3.32)         
0.03428         
(3.26)         
0.07154         
(3.85)         
 0.06550 
(3.43) 
0.08269 
(3.65) 
0.09473 
(4.13) 
Scientific Mobility -0.19580         
(-3.27)         
-0.28686         
(-3.24)         
-0.30977         
(-3.85)         
 -0.49921 
(-3.45) 
-0.75380 
(-3.66) 
-0.40784 
(-4.18) 
log (Sales) -0.00171         
(-0.83)         
-0.00281         
(-1.37)         
-0.00351         
(-1.74)         
 -0.00228 
(-0.91) 
-0.00290 
(-1.61) 
-0.00244 
(-0.99) 
log (Industry Sales) -0.00744         
(-3.06)         
-0.00790         
(-3.26)         
-0.00823         
(-3.39)         
 -0.00529 
(-1.84) 
-0.00495 
(-1.71) 
-0.00503 
(-1.74) 
Industry Sales Growth 0.07370         
(4.24)         
0.07183         
(4.18)         
0.07069         
(4.11)         
 0.05433 
(2.74) 
0.05496 
(2.77) 
0.05315 
(2.62) 
log (q) | t - 1 0.84676         
(65.4)         
0.84870         
(65.3)         
0.85045         
(64.9)         
 0.85745 
(65.27) 
0.85930 
(65.74) 
0.85859 
(66.32) 
GDP Growth -0.05984         
(-1.10)         
-0.14815         
(-1.84)         
-0.16383         
(-2.35)         
 -0.26098 
(-2.39) 
-0.48159 
(-2.99) 
-0.16832 
(-2.41) 
Sargan 185.01 (165) 
(p = 0.136) 
186.17 (165) 
(p = 0.124) 
181.94 (165) 
(p = 0.174) 
 151.00 (134) 
(p = 0.150) 
152.04 (134) 
(p = 0.136) 
154.50 (134) 
(p = 0.109) 
Arellano-Bond (𝑚𝑚1) -2.38  
(p = 0.018) 
-2.46  
(p = 0.010) 
-2.55  
(p = 0.011) 
 -2.50 
(p = 0.012) 
-2.51 
(p = 0.012) 
-2.49 
(p = 0.013) 
Arellano-Bond (𝑚𝑚2) -0.079  
(p = 0.484) 
-0.80  
(p = 0.424) 
-0.801  
(p = 0.423) 
 -0.725 
(p = 0.468) 
-0.619 
(p = 0.536) 
-0.465 
(p = 0.642) 
        
Sample size 12802 12802 12802  11442 11442 11442 
 
NOTES:   
 
(1) Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity, t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(2) All columns include year dummies, dummies for sectors, and a dummy for having zero R&D expenditures (flow) that year 
(coefficients not reported). Columns 4 through 6 additionally include state dummies. 
(3) Instruments used for firm-level variables are combinations of lagged differences dated t – 2 through t – 10;  
(4) Instruments for the mobility rate (in all columns) are the logarithm of the average age of scientists in the industry sector, 
logarithms of the fraction of scientists that are male, and the fraction of those that are married and do not live alone. Columns 4 
through 6 additionally use the coding for NCC enforcement by Garmaise (2011) and Bird and Knopf (2010) as an instrument.   
(5) Instruments for log 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1  (in all columns) are lagged differences of log𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , dated t – 3 and t – 4; 
(6) Degrees of freedom for the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is given in parenthesis. 
 
 
  
Table 8 
Labor mobility, additional calculations (using estimates in Table 7) 
 
Sectoral Mobility of Scientific Personnel  Geographic Mobility of Scientific Personnel 
Spillover pools are aggregated within sector, 
using technological proximity 
Spillover pools are aggregated using 
technological and geographic proximity 
 
(A) Percentage change in market value as a result of a percentage point increase in the mobility rate  
 SP =𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆   SP =𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  
Positive effect (interaction term) 1.978 % 3.001 % 3.110 %  4.161 % 6.514 % 3.196 % 
Negative effect (mobility term) -1.939 % -2.840 % -3.067 %  -4.497 % -6.791 % -3.674 % 
Net effect 0.039 % 0.161 % 0.043 %  -0.336 % -0.277 % -0.478 % 
        
 
(B) Percentage of the overall spillover effect, as mobility rate changes… 
 SP =𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆   SP =𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  
…by one standard deviation 17,66 % 16,54 % 15,91 %  13,81 % 13,59 % 13,70 % 
…from minimum to mean 40,77 % 38,87 % 37,78 %  42,73 % 42,28 % 42,50 % 
        
NOTE: Positive and negative effects may not add to the net effect exactly, due to rounding. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
GMM regressions 
Dependent variable: log (𝑽𝑽𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊/𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) 
 
Sectoral Mobility of Scientific Personnel  Geographic Mobility of Scientific Personnel 
Spillover pools are aggregated within sector, 
using technological proximity 
Spillover pools are aggregated using technological 
and geographic proximity 
 
(1)  
SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  (2)  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆  (3)  SP = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆   (4)  SP =𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  (5)  SP =𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  (6)  SP =𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺  
        
R&D / Assets 0.03845 
(9.59) 
0.03676 
(9.10) 
0.05593 
(6.19) 
 0.04199 
(8.14) 
0.04243 
(8.26) 
0.06931  
(2.73) 
Citations / Patents -0.00189 
(-2.59) 
-0.00199 
(-2.64) 
-0.00174  
(-2.23) 
 -0.00096 
(-1.00) 
-0.00097 
(-1.01) 
-0.00116  
(-1.41) 
Spillover Pool 0.09777 
(3.45) 
0.09614 
(2.67) 
0.13377 
(3.78)  
0.12004 
(2.23) 
0.12591 
(2.33) 
0.13211  
(2.26) 
     Scientific Mobility  
 × Spillover Pool 
0.04241 
(3.64) 
0.04163 
(4.23) 
0.05784  
(3.95)  
0.05163 
(2.25) 
0.05427 
(2.36) 
0.05476  
(2.23) 
     Scientific Mobility  
 × Competition  
-0.05688 
(-2.40) 
-0.06485 
(-2.64) 
-0.07450  
(-2.90)  
-0.09691 
(-3.54) 
-0.09674 
(-3.51) 
-0.07811  
(-2.62) 
     Scientific Mobility  
 × (R&D / Assets) 
  0.00646  
(1.55)  
  0.01026  
(-1.01) 
Scientific Mobility -0.35630 
(-3.64) 
-0.34816 
(-3.44) 
-0.49249 
(-3.99)  
-0.47367 
(-2.27) 
-0.49568 
(-2.37) 
-0.50402  
(-2.25) 
Aggregate Mobility  -0.04031 
(-1.59) 
-0.02964  
(-1.10)  
 -0.04210 
(-1.24) 
-0.03087  
(-0.81) 
log (Sales) -0.00422 
(2.00) 
-0.00361 
(-1.71) 
-0.00249  
(-1.15) 
 -0.00215 
(-0.82) 
-0.00201 
(-0.76) 
-0.00303  
(-1.09) 
log (Industry Sales) -0.00722 
(-2.84) 
-0.00750 
(-2.94) 
-0.00787  
(-2.94) 
 -0.00521 
(-1.72) 
-0.00538 
(-1.77) 
-0.00660  
(-2.01) 
Industry Sales Growth -0.14592 
(-2.08) 
0.07149 
(3.96) 
0.07906  
(4.11) 
 0.06068 
(3.08) 
0.06011 
(3.04) 
0.07155  
(3.25) 
log (q) | t - 1 0.85021 
(62.87) 
0.84253 
(65.05) 
0.83310 
(63.95) 
 0.84060 
(63.26) 
0.84160 
(62.07) 
0.83479 
(55.87) 
GDP Growth -0.19292 
(-2.17) 
-0.22240 
(-2.21) 
-0.34124  
(-2.81) 
 -0.24576 
(-1.51) 
-0.28903 
(-1.77) 
-0.28734  
(-1.63) 
Sargan 182.32 (164) 
(p = 0.156) 
184.94 (165) 
(p = 0.137) 
179.03 (164) 
(p = 0.200) 
 144.55 (131) 
(p = 0.197) 
144.66 (131) 
(p = 0.196) 
135.01 (121) 
(p = 0.181) 
Arellano-Bond (𝑚𝑚1) -2.22  
(p = 0.026) 
-2.26  
(p = 0.024) 
-1.78  
(p = 0.075) 
 -2.37 
(p = 0.018) 
-2.38 
(p = 0.017) 
-1.87 
(p = 0.061) 
Arellano-Bond (𝑚𝑚2) -1.200  
(p = 0.230) 
-0.608  
(p = 0.543) 
-0.128  
(p = 0.898) 
 -0.228 
(p = 0.820) 
-0.248 
(p = 0.804) 
-0.002 
(p = 0.998) 
        
Sample size 12283 12283 11052  11002 11002 9809 
 
NOTES:   
(1) Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity, t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(2) All columns include year dummies, dummies for sectors, and a dummy for having zero R&D expenditures (flow) that year 
(coefficients not reported). Columns 4 through 6 additionally include state dummies. 
(3) Instruments used for firm-level variables are combinations of lagged differences dated t – 2 through t – 10;  
(4) Instruments for the mobility rate (in all columns) are the logarithm of the average age of scientists in the industry sector, logarithms 
of the fraction of scientists that are male, and the fraction of those that are married and do not live alone. Columns 4 through 6 
additionally use the coding for NCC enforcement by Garmaise (2011) and Bird and Knopf (2010) as an instrument.   
(5) Instruments for log 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 (in all columns) are lagged differences of log𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , dated t – 3 and t – 4; 
(6) Degrees of freedom for the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is given in parenthesis. 
 
Table A1 
GMM regressions – Specification search 
Dependent variable: log (q).  
Mobility: Sectoral Mobility. Spillover pool: 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺,𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝑺𝑺  
 
(1) 
GMM  
Levels 
(2) 
SYSTEM 
GMM 
(3) 
GMM 
Levels 
(4) 
GMM  
Levels 
(5) 
GMM  
Levels 
(6) 
GMM  
Levels 
(7) 
GMM  
Levels 
(8) 
GMM  
Levels 
R&D / Assets 0.05426         (5.03)         
0.03473 
(9.07)                 
0.03565         
(4.92)         
0.03909         
(5.42)         
0.02419         
(2.75)         
0.03418         
(9.03)         
0.04016         
(9.80)         
0.03888         
(9.49)         
Citations / Patents 0.00437         (4.10)        
0.00333         
(4.73)         
0.00193         
(1.28)         
0.00162         
(1.08)         
-0.00251         
(-1.48)         
-0.00015         
(-0.26)         
-0.00153         
(-2.16)         
-0.00154         
(-2.18)         
Spillover Pool -0.03720         (-1.27)         
-0.00961         
(-0.63)         
0.04089         
(1.90)         
0.09037         
(2.79)         
0.07410         
(2.23)         
0.09735         
(4.12)         
0.07903         
(3.11)         
0.08360         
(3.12)         
Sectoral Mobility  
 × Spillover Pool 
0.02621         
(3.60)         
0.01430         
(4.47)         
0.02413 
(3.85)                 
0.04583 
(3.82)                 
0.04739         
(3.66)         
0.04218 
(4.34)                 
0.03428         
(3.26)         
0.03225         
(2.96)         
Sectoral Mobility -0.17210         (-2.89)         
-0.09883         
(-3.68)         
-0.17624 
(-3.36)                 
-0.35793         
(-3.50)         
-0.37400 
(-3.40)                 
-0.35142         
(-4.28)         
-0.28686         
(-3.24)         
-0.28568         
(-2.77)         
         
log (Sales) 0.02190         (1.94)         
-0.01182         
(-1.74)         
-0.01114 
(-1.31)                 
-0.01280         
(-1.52)         
-0.00207         
(-0.29)         
-0.00275         
(-1.37)         
-0.00281         
(-1.37)         
-0.00279         
(-1.37)         
log (Industry Sales) 0.05175         (3.12)         
-0.02466 
(-2.88)                 
-0.02385 
(-2.26)                 
-0.02664         
(-2.52)         
-0.03008 
(-3.24)                 
-0.00769         
(-3.24)         
-0.00790         
(-3.26)         
-0.00798         
(-3.30)         
Industry Sales Growth 0.25878         (6.25)         
0.16487         
(8.01)         
0.21040 
(5.63)                 
0.21756         
(5.83)         
0.18442         
(5.06)         
0.07260         
(4.31)         
0.07183         
(4.18)         
0.06973         
(4.14)         
         
log (q) | pre-sample      
0.40576         
(23.4)            
log (q) | t - 1       
0.84871         
(73.0)         
0.84870         
(65.3)         
0.85095         
(65.4)         
GDP Growth        
-0.14815 
(-1.84)                 
-0.13475         
(-1.61)         
     Sectoral Mobility × GDP Gr.         
0.00591         
(1.28)         
     Spillover Pool × GDP Gr.         
-0.00312         
(-4.80)         
         
Sargan 231.88 (165) (p = 0.000) 
389.98 (292) 
(p = 0.000) 
154.97 (152) 
(p = 0.418) 
165.60 (154) 
(p = 0.247) 
150.58 (140) 
(p = 0.256) 
199.32 (179) 
(p = 0.142) 
186.17 (165) 
(p=0.124) 
184.95 (165) 
(p = 0.137) 
Arellano-Bond (𝑚𝑚1) 17.11  (p = 0.000) -5.01  (p = 0.000) 20.06  (p = 0.000) 20.05  (p = 0.000) 18.92 (p = 0.000) -2.74 (p = 0.006) -2.46 (p = 0.014) -2.50 (p = 0.013) 
Arellano-Bond (𝑚𝑚2) 15.47  (p = 0.000)  -4.38  (p = 0.000)  18.04  (p = 0.000) 18.04  (p = 0.000) 17.15 (p = 0.000) -1.10 (p = 0.271) -0.80 (p = 0.424) -0.97 (p = 0.334) 
Sample size 12802 12802 12802 12802 12802 12802 12802 12802 
 
 NOTES:   
 
(1) All equations include a complete set of year dummies, except columns 7 and 8, where one dummy is suppressed to avoid perfect multicollinearity.  All 
columns include dummies for industry sectors, and a dummy for having zero R&D expenditures that year (coefficients not reported). Standard errors are 
robust to arbitrary form of heteroscedasticity, t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
(2) Instruments used for firm-level variables are,   
 Column 1: lagged levels dated t – 2 through t – 8;  
 Column 2: lagged levels dated t – 3 through t – 8 in the equation for differences, and lagged differences of the same dates in the levels equation. 
 Columns 3-8: combinations lagged differences dated t – 2 through t – 10. 
(3) Instruments for the mobility rate (in columns 4-8) are the logarithm of the average age of scientists in the industry sector, logarithms of the fraction of 
scientists that are male, and the fraction of those that are married and do not live alone.  
(4) Instruments for log𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 (in columns 6-8) are lagged differences of log 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 , dated t – 3 and t – 4;  
(5) Degrees of freedom for the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is given in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
